By Sylvain Sorin
The aim of the e-book is to offer the elemental ends up in the idea of two-person zero-sum repeated video games together with stochastic video games and repeated video games with incomplete details. It underlines their relation in the course of the operator method and covers either asymptotic and uniform homes. The monograph is self-contained together with presentation of incomplete info video games, minmax theorems and approachability effects. it's adressed to graduate scholars without past wisdom of the sector.
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Additional info for A First Course on Zero Sum Repeated Games
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